The Incompatibility of Game Theory and Kyoto Protocol
Abstract
This research aimed to determine the reasons why Kyoto Protocol failed.
In order to gather the needed information, the researcher only utilized information coming from legitimate institutions like the UNFCCC, research about Kyoto Protocol published in the web of science and from the Institute of Scientific Information (ISI) journals like Elsevier, Thompson Reuters, SciVerse, Scimago and from commentaries of world leaders and environmentalists.
In order to access these materials, the researcher utilized EBSCOHOST as the primary search engine, with the aid of google scholar as additional search platform.
The research utilized descriptive method coupled with qualitative and quantitative approach. The results of the study indicated that uncooperative act known as prisoner’s dilemma is the main reason why Kyoto Protocol failed. The presence of United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) which is the main convenor of Kyoto Protocol proved to be useless. It has no police power and cannot even sanction erring members or parties to the agreement.
Meeting the goals of Kyoto Protocol is hard to accomplish when the parties involved betray in the agreement like what happened to the two prisoners in the highly celebrated doctrine of known cooperation known as Prisoner’s dilemma.
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